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Introduction
Why do firms pay dividends? This question has long attracted theoretical and empirical research. Since the Miller and Modigliani (1961) irrelevance theorem of dividend policy, empirical research (e.g., Allen and Michaely 2003 , Denis and Osobov 2008 and survey evidence (e.g., Lintner 1956, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely 2005) have shown that payout policies of firms do matter to markets and managers. For example, firms smooth dividends, as investors respond negatively to dividend decreases (e.g., John and Williams 1985 , Miller and Rock 1985 , Allen, Bernardo, and Welch 2000 , Brav et al. 2005 , while firms use share repurchases as a flexible channel to distribute cash to shareholders (e.g., Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach 2000, Grullon and Michaely 2002) . Further, payout policies respond to tax changes (Poterba 2004 Chetty and Saez 2005 , Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner 2007 , Moser 2007 , Blouin, Ready, and Shackelford 2011 .
However, this extensive literature focuses mainly on listed firms.
The goal of this paper is to shed light on payout policies of privately held corporations and on the economic mechanisms behind payout policies. Very little is known about payout policies of unlisted corporations, largely because of a lack of comprehensive data. There are many differences between public and private firms that potentially explain differences in payout policies. For example, public firms face higher agency costs than privately held firms (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen 1986) . Michaely and Roberts (2012) find that privately held firms smooth dividends significantly less than public firms and that private firms pay less dividends.
In privately held firms with close ties between management and ownership, agency costs are lower than in corporations with dispersed ownership. Besides low agency costs, there is at least one additional explanation for the lower level of dividend payouts in privately held corporations:
owner-managers can receive payouts from the firm in the form of wages or dividends. 1 The main contribution of the present paper is that we generate empirical evidence on both these payout channels, namely, dividends and wages to owner-managers. We specifically address and provide empirical answers to three main questions. 1) How do privately held corporations distribute cash to shareholders? 2) Do payout channels differ in their flexibility? and 3) How does the owner's income taxation shape payout policies of private firms? While the answers to these questions may appear intuitive, there have been no comprehensive empirical results on the payout behavior of privately held firms. In most countries, such as the United
States (see, e.g., Yagan 2013) and the United Kingdom (see, e.g., Michaely and Roberts 2012), 1 There are other potential payout channels, such as capital decreases. At least empirically, this is a rare event in our sample. Further, there is no tax advantage of share repurchases over dividends. Alternative, yet unobservable payout channels are shareholder loans, wages to family members, or consumption on the job. privately held firms form an important, yet often overlooked, component of the economy. An empirical confirmation of expected payout behavior of private firms helps us to understand the effect of public policies on a large part of the economy.
Our study is based on a large body of administrative panel data that comprises all corporate tax returns of closely held corporations in Sweden and income tax returns of all their active shareholders. About 60% of all Swedish corporations are closely held corporations.
2 These firms are not listed and have few shareholders, often just one active owner. Since we can link shareholders' individual income tax returns to the corresponding corporate tax data, we can observe dividend and wage payouts from the corporation to the shareholder, as well as shareholder characteristics, such as marginal tax rate on dividends and wages. Summary statistics indicate an answer to our first research question, namely, that wages appear to be the dominant payout channel to owner-managers. Over two-thirds of owner-managers receive wages from their own firms, while just over one-third receives dividends. Wages average three times higher than dividends.
As with listed firms, we argue that there is a difference in flexibility across payout channels.
For owner-managers of closely held corporations, the corporation is often their major source of income. Therefore, shareholders require constant payments from their own corporation(s) for consumption purposes. Even though owner-managers directly shape payout policies, there are several reasons as to why wages and dividends may not be perfect substitutes. Other stakeholders can affect the choice of payout channel, and covenants with debtholders may restrict dividend payouts to profits while allowing smooth wages, even in years with losses.
Further, owner wages are typically subject to social security contributions on the employer and/or employee level, which generate rights to future unemployment or pension benefits. To grant these benefits to owner-managers, firms pay out a constant level of wages. Moreover, owner-managers can use a constant wage stream to qualify for mortgages at the household level.
Taken together, we expect that wages are stickier than dividends.
We empirically test differences in the flexibility of dividend and wage payouts using the Lintner (1956) model (see, e.g., Brav et al. 2005 , Skinner 2008 , Michaely and Roberts 2012 .
We find that wages are stickier than dividend payouts. Our speed of adjustment estimate for dividends (0.93) is comparable to the estimate of 0.83 of Michaely and Roberts (2012) for dividends of closely held firms in the United Kingdom. Our estimate for the speed of adjustment 2 We use the term "Closely Held Corporation" in accordance with Swedish tax law. A closely held corporation is a corporation where four or fewer active shareholders hold at least 50% of voting rights. According to the tax law, a shareholder is regarded as active if he is involved in profit generation to a considerable extent. Firms can have more than four owners if the owners are relatives. Approximately 60% of our sample firms have one active shareholder. About 30% of our sample firms have two active shareholders. Therefore, our definition is close to what Michaely and Roberts (2012) denote as wholly owned firms.
of wage income (0.503) is close to prior estimates for smoothness of dividends in listed firms, which range from 0.39 to 0.55 (see, e.g., Brav et al. 2005, van We use the method developed in Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011) to generate empirical evidence on tax sensitivity of payout channels. More specifically, we test whether there is bunching around large changes in shareholder marginal tax rate (e.g., Saez 2010 , Chetty et al. 2011 . We find that the number of owner-managers who set their wages around the income tax kink exceeds by more than 300% the expected number of owner-managers at that point in absence of the kink. That is, shareholders set their wage payout at a level around the point where the marginal tax rate increases by 20 percentage points. However, in contrast to wage income, we observe a discontinuity in dividend income around the change in dividend tax rate. Owner-managers pay out dividends as long as dividends are taxed at the preferential rate.
They avoid paying dividends as soon as they are at the kink in the tax rate. There are three potential explanations for this effect. First, taxpayers may confuse average taxes with marginal taxes (de Bartolome 1995) . Second, the jump in the marginal tax rate is very salient (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009, Finkelstein 2009 ). Third, owner-managers can defer dividend payouts to later years. This behavior indicates that dividends are more sensitive to taxes than wages.
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We repeat all main tests for firms with exactly one active owner and find very similar results for the difference in flexibility as well as for the tax sensitivity of wages and dividends.
The tax sensitivity of dividends has implications for firm cash holdings. When dividend distributions to owners reach the maximum dividend allowance, firms retain earnings instead of paying out more dividends or switching to labor income. Following the empirical approach of Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , we test whether the income-sensitivity of real investments and cash holdings is higher for firms in which owners face high income taxes on additional dividend payouts. Our results suggest that real investment is not affected. Rather, we find that firms hold more cash. This result implies that the dividend ceiling effectively leads to greater cash holdings at the firm level, at the cost of cash holdings at the shareholder level.
These cash holdings can reduce insolvency risk or increase investment in the long run.
Our results imply that wages in private corporations assume the role of dividends in public corporations. Similar to the role of share repurchases for listed firms, dividends are a more flexible payout mechanism for closely held, private corporations. This finding has policy implications. Any policy that targets dividend payouts of firms has heterogeneous effects across listed and unlisted corporations. A tentative policy change that similarly targets both, listed and unlisted corporations mandates integration of labor income taxes and dividend taxes and potentially a differential taxation on listed and unlisted corporations.
Institutional Background and Taxation of Corporations in Sweden

Role of Closely Held Corporations in Sweden
There are about 315,000 corporations registered in Sweden subject to corporate taxes (2009 statistics). In our sample period, a firm required at least Swedish krona (SEK) 100,000 (about USD 13,550) in nominal equity. Closely held corporations play an important role in the Swedish economy. In 2009, 64% of firms are closely held corporations. They account for about 30% of the workforce in all corporations. The status closely held relates to the number of active shareholders. A firm is treated as a closely held corporation for tax purposes if it is not listed and if four or fewer active shareholders possess at least 50% of the voting rights.
Corporate Tax System and Taxation of Payouts
Similar to the United States, Sweden has a classical corporate tax system. All corporations are subject to a proportional corporate income tax of 28% (26.3% as of 2009). The two alternative payout channels, wages and dividends, are treated differently for tax purposes.
Wages are tax deductible at the corporate level, but are subject to income taxes at the shareholder level. The progressive labor income tax schedule has three major stages, as shown in Labor income is additionally subject to social security contributions at the corporate level.
Up to a certain threshold, these contributions generate benefits in the form of health insurance, unemployment, and pension benefits. However, above this threshold, any marginal social security contribution ceases to generate additional benefits. These contributions become a pure tax. Therefore, we treat these contributions as insurance up to the cutoff, and marginal contributions in excess of the cutoff as a tax. See , Appendix I, for a detailed description of the tax system and the calculations. In our calculations, we neglect the standard deduction and the earned income tax credit. This does not alter the relative taxation of wages and dividends, since the standard deduction and earned income tax credit reduce the tax burden only on earned income of individuals who are not subject to the state tax 5
In widely held corporations (WHCs), income shifting across payout channels is less relevant, since owners may not accept payout choices in the self-interest of the manager. Therefore, there is no cap on dividend payouts for widely held corporations. All dividends are taxed at a rate of 30%. In 2005, the tax rate on dividends from WHCs was reduced to 25%. In our sample, we focus on CHCs.
(see, e.g., Saez 2005 or Yagan 2013 
Data and Sample Overview
Data
We base our study on the Firm Register and Individual Database (FRIDA) provided by Statistics Sweden (see, also, , 2013a , 2013b In 2007, the Swedish wealth tax was abolished. However, equity invested in closely held corporations was not added to the tax base of the wealth tax and were therefore wealth-tax exempt. Therefore, we believe that the wealth tax and its abolition have no impact on the payout behavior of closely held corporations.
education, and family size. Through unique identifiers in all three pillars of our data set, we link information on firms and their shareholders.
Administrative tax data, such as FRIDA, have the advantage that all firms are required to file a corporate tax statement. Studies based on accounting data face the problem that data coverage of small firms is very poor due to lack of filing requirements for small enterprises (e.g., Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz 2006 , Michaely and Roberts 2012 , Gao, Harford, and Li 2013 We exclude firm-years with negative values in total assets, nominal capital, sales, turnover, or scheduled depreciation. Using information from the K10-form, we derive the ownership share and the number of owners in a firm. Note that after the 2006 reform, some 5% of all shareholders overstate their ownership share to claim higher dividend allowances (Alstadsaeter and Jacob 2013b) . This type of tax evasion and misreporting does not alter our results, since we use number of owners as the measure of agency costs. Also, excluding these cases changes none of our results.
Sample Overview
indicator variables. Finally, we use a variable on the mix of payout channels. [Insert Table 2 about here] On average, owner-managers receive a wage of SEK 197,051 and a dividend of SEK 66,358. These statistics include both non-payers and payers. Some 68% of owner-managers receive a salary while only 37.5% receive a dividend. Wages are substantially increased in 8.3%
of observations. In contrast, dividends are initiated or increased more often; we observe dividend increases in 19.9% of observations.
As firm variables, we use measures for growth opportunities, internal funds, profitability, size, capital structure, and agency costs. Panel B of Table 2 summarizes our main firm-level variables. Since Tobin's q is not observable due to lack of market prices, we proxy growth opportunities through the percentage change in fixed assets from t-1 to t (Investments). 8 We include Cash, defined as cash and short-term investments over total assets, and Retained Earnings (scaled by total assets) as measures for internal funds. We use taxable corporate income over total assets as the measure for profitability (Profit). We control for capital structure and include total book debt over total assets (Leverage). We use the natural logarithm of total assets (Ln(Total Assets)) and the number of employees (Num Employees) as measures of size.
On average, firms hold 15% of their assets as cash and have a retained earnings (debt) to assets ratio of about 11% (34%). The average closely held corporation has about 4 employees.
Investment varies considerably from 0% (10 th percentile) to 85% (90 th percentile) and averages 40.2%. We further include the number of owners (Number Owners) in the firm as a measure of agency costs. On average, a closely held corporation has two owners.
As shareholder characteristics (Panel C of We control for depreciation when calculating investments. We define investments as the difference between fixed assets in year t minus prior year fixed assets plus prior year depreciation. We standardize investments by prior year fixed assets to obtain growth in fixed assets.
owner-managers are subject to the first level of state tax. The majority of owner-managers participate in exactly one firm. On average, owner-managers hold shares in 1.17 closely held corporations. In 45% of our observations, the owner-manager holds shares in exactly one firm, as the only active owner (Single CHC). Such firms correspond very closely to the Jensen and Meckling (1976) notion of 100% owner-managed firms without agency costs. Finally, Age is the owner-manager's age in years and High Education is a dummy variable equal to 1 of the owner-manager has a university degree, and zero otherwise.
Wages and Dividends as Payout Channels-Empirical Results
Aggregate Results
Figure 2 However, in all sample years, wage income is the most important payout channel.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Let us now turn our attention to the flexibility of the two payout channels, wages and dividends. There are many reasons as to why dividends and wages are not perfect substitutes and why dividends are more flexible. First, there may be legal frictions in the wage-dividend mix. In Sweden, there is no legal cap on dividends. Yet there are tax consequences at the shareholder level if firms pay out dividends in excess of the individual shareholder's dividend allowance.
Second, wage payments from a corporation to the owner-manager are subject to social security contributions at the corporate level. Third, other stakeholders in the firm may limit the use of either payout channel. For example, creditors may restrict dividend payouts as a condition for providing liquidity. They may allow for a constant, yet restricted owner-wage for consumption purposes. Fourth, wages may be perceived as fair remuneration for labor supply in the firm.
Owner-managers compensate their efforts through a constant wage, while they use dividends as means of paying out excess profits.
We present two figures that set forth graphical evidence that dividends are more flexible than wages. Figure An alternative way of comparing the flexibility of payout channels is to look at the frequency of wage payouts and dividend payouts of firms that exist over the entire sample period. Since the high increase and initiation rates in dividend payouts are not associated with an increase in the number of dividend-paying firms in the pre-reform period, firms apparently omit dividend payouts more frequently than they omit wage payouts. To analyze the frequency of dividend and wage payouts, we restrict the sample to firms extant in all 10 sample years. We count the number of years in which the firm pays out wages and dividends, respectively. Figure   4 presents the distribution of years with either dividend (gray bars) or wage payout (black bars).
We observe very few firms that consistently pay out dividends in all sample years (7.9%). More than half of firms pay dividends in only four or fewer years (56.6%). Some 14.5% never pay out dividends and 12.6% pay dividends in only 1 of the 10 sample years. In contrast, 45% of the firms consistently pay wages in all sample years. The median firm pays wages (dividends) in 9 (4) of the 10 sample years.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Stickiness and Flexibility of Wages and Dividends
The aggregate statistics provide the first indications that dividends are more flexible than wages. We next provide more direct evidence of this notion. If dividends are more flexible than wages, firm dividend policies should be more responsive to transitory earnings shocks than wage policies. We test this hypothesis using the Lintner (1956) model (see, also, Fama and Babiak 1968 , Brav et al. 2005 , Skinner 2008 , van Eije and Megginson 2008 , Michaely and Roberts 2012 . We formulate the model for owner-manager i during period t:
where wages to the owner-manager (Labor CHC) and dividends to the owner-manager (Dividend CHC) (measured in SEK) are payout variables (Payout). We use operating income before owner wages as a measure for earnings. We are interested in the 1 coefficient. The 1 coefficient (multiplied by -1) is the measure of the speed of adjustment to the target payout ratio.
A high value for 1 suggests that transitory earnings shocks translate into changes in the level of payout. A 1 coefficient close to 0 indicates that the respective payout channel is sticky and not responsive to earnings shocks.
The estimation of equation (1) presents several empirical challenges, in particular, due to the short time series of 10 years. Therefore, we follow the approach by Brav et al. (2005) and
Michaely and Roberts (2012) and estimate equation (1) separately for each owner-manager. If an owner-manager owns more than one firm, we sum dividends, wages, and earnings, respectively, across firms. We normalize all variables by prior year total assets to control for scale effects. We weight earnings with ownership share. Finally, we restrict the sample to active owners where we have information on all 10 sample years. We require firms to pay dividends and wages in at least one sample year.
We present our coefficient estimates for speed of adjustment in two ways. First, Panel A of Figure 5 presents the density function of coefficient estimates for the speed of adjustment (SoA).
The black (gray) line represents the density function for wages (dividends). Table 3 presents summary statistics for the distribution of parameter estimates from equation (1) Table 3 presents results with wages as the payout variables.
Panel B uses dividends as the payout variable. We highlight mean and median of SoA in bold. In Panel C of Table 3 , we additionally present summary statistics for the difference in SoA calculated separately for each owner-manager. Panel B of Figure 5 presents the corresponding plot of the density function.
[ Table 3 about here]
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
We observe a large difference in SoA across payout channels. The estimates imply that dividends respond more strongly to transitory earnings shocks than wages. The difference between payout channels is large and amounts to 0.430 (median 0.438). To put the estimates for SoA into perspective, Michaely and Roberts (2012) document an SoA of 0.83 for wholly owned, private firms. This is close to our estimate of 0.93 for the SoA of dividends of closely held corporations. Our estimate for owner wages (mean 0.503, median 0.479) corresponds to estimates of the SoA of dividends in public firms. SoA estimates for public firms, for example, range from 0.39 (Brav et al. 2005 (Brav et al. , 1984 (Brav et al. -2002 Figure A .1 of the Online Appendix). Our results suggest that owner wages (dividends) in private firms respond to transitory earnings shocks as dividends (share repurchases) in public firms respond to changes in earnings.
The results in Table 3 show that there is considerable variation in the SoA of both payout channels. For example, SoA of wages varies from 0.140 (25 th percentile) to 0.887 (75 th percentile). The density plot in Panel A of Figure 5 illustrates the variation in estimated SoA coefficients across payout channels. To understand the differences in SoA in wages and dividends across firms, we use the estimated 1 coefficients from equation (1) as dependent variables and test whether there is symmetric variation in flexibility of payout channels across firms with respect to firm and shareholder-level variables (see, e.g., Leary and Michaely 2011, for listed firms). Table 4 presents regression results with the SoA estimates as dependent variables. For each independent variable, we use the mean over the sample period.
[Insert Table 4 Our results from Table 4 show that shareholder characteristics explain some portion of the symmetric variation in the flexibility of wages and dividends in private firms. For example, if the shareholder is subject to the additional surtax on labor income of 20%, wages and dividends become more flexible and respond more quickly to transitory earnings shocks. Married shareholders are also more flexible in wages and in dividends. A higher number of firms is associated with smoother payouts.
Finally, we control for agency costs. In firms with many owners, other shareholders may limit owners' ability to control payouts from the corporation. Hence, wages and dividends become less flexible. We use Single CHC and the number of owners (Number Owners) as measures of agency costs. Firms with only one active owner-manager follow the definition of Jensen and Meckling (1976) , where all agency costs are internalized (Single CHC = 1). In firms with many owners, there could be some agency costs and the individual owner manager may not be able to shape the payout policy according to his personal preferences. Consistent with this argument, we find that agency costs substantially decrease flexibility of wages and dividends.
However, there are substantial differences in economic magnitude. 
Determinants of Payout Policies
In this section, we are interested in the determinants of payout policies of privately held firms. We estimate the following equation using OLS regressions: We measure all variables at the shareholder level. That is, firm-level variables are linked to the respective shareholder. In case a shareholder owns more than one firm, we use the average of firm characteristics across firms weighted by ownership share. 10 We base our statistical inference on robust standard errors clustered at the shareholder level. Table 5 show that there are some differences in coefficients across payout channels. For example, if firms are in a high cash position, the likelihood of increasing dividends is higher. In contrast, a higher cash position reduces the share of payout through wages. Instead, firms use dividends to distribute excess cash. If firms have high growth opportunities, wage payments increase while dividend payout, with the exception of likelihood to pay, is largely unaffected. We also find a negative effect of leverage on likelihood to pay, to initiate, or to increase dividends. The positive effect of debt on wages indicates an important difference between listed and privately held firms. While debt reduces dividend payout in listed firms, it increases wage payout in private firms. This is consistent with the argument that debt covenants affect payout policies. Owner-managers require some payout from their firm for consumption purposes. Creditors of highly leveraged firms appear to allow owner-managers to pay themselves a wage, but they restrict dividend payouts.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
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We choose this research design for data availability reasons. For each shareholder, we observe amount of dividends and wages received from all closely held corporations in which the shareholder actively participates. We cannot identify the exact source of dividend and wage payout if one owner has more than one firm. Therefore, we estimate equation (2) at the shareholder level. We test the robustness of our research design and restrict the sample, where owner-managers fully control exactly one firm. We obtain similar results and report regression results in Table A .1 in the Appendix.
Retained earnings positively affect all six payout variables. The positive coefficient for
Percentage Wage and Percentage Div do not contradict each other, as we set both variables to 0 if there is no payout at all. The positive signs in both regressions imply that firms with higher retained earnings increase both, dividends and wage payments to owners. The economic magnitudes of the effects are of importance in the case of retained earnings. A one-standarddeviation increase in retained earnings relative to total assets (about 0.286) increases the percentage of total payout distributed as wages by only 0.95 percentage points, or 1.5% of the unconditional mean. In contrast, the effect on dividend volume is economically significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in retained earnings increases the percentage of distributions paid through dividends by 12% of the unconditional mean. This shows that dividends are more responsive to changes in retained earnings than wages and corresponds to our findings from above. Further, we find that larger firms (Ln(Total Assets)) have higher payouts and are more likely to pay wages and dividends; they are also more likely to increase dividend payouts. This result is consistent with the evidence for listed firms.
Our results in Table 5 indicate that not only firm-level, but also shareholder-level variables affect payout behavior of private corporations. We find a negative effect from our state tax dummy variables on the likelihood to pay or increase wages to owner-managers. Further, owner-managers pay out less funds through wages as opposed to dividends if they are subject to the state tax. We find the opposite results for our three dividend variables. These findings indicate that choice of payout channel and level of payouts are affected by shareholder-level taxation. Again, there are differences in tax sensitivity across payout channels. For example, if the shareholder is subject to the first level (second level) of the state tax, the percentage of total payout received through wages decreases by 0.48 (2.96) percentage points-0.8% (4.7%) of the unconditional mean. This is a rather small effect. In contrast, the percentage of total payout received as a dividend payout increases by 0.97 (2.81) percentage points. This is equivalent to an increase of 6.2% (18%) of the unconditional mean. It thus appears that dividends are more sensitive to the personal income tax than are wages. There are, however, some concerns about identification of tax effects using equation (2), since the dummy variables may correlate with other factors such as income. We address these concerns in Section 5 below, where we use a more compelling identification strategy by exploiting large kinks in the tax rate schedule.
Another important aspect of payout policies is shareholder demand for owner wages. If the shareholder generates substantial income outside the closely held corporation (Relevance Non-CHC), the propensity to pay wages and the share of income earned through wages decrease. A one-standard-deviation increase in the percentage of total income generated outside the closely held corporation decreases the likelihood to pay wages by 9.5% and reduces the share of payout in the form of wages by about 10%. We further find a negative effect from age and a positive effect from number of firms in all regressions. In sum, our findings in Table 3 indicate that not only firm-level characteristics, but also shareholder-level characteristics affect payout behavior of unlisted closely held corporations.
Tax Sensitivity of Wages and Dividends to Owner-managers
Tax Sensitivity of Owner Wages
We next take advantage of our detailed information on shareholders and analyze the tax sensitivity of wages and dividends paid to owner-managers. The results in Section 4 are a first indication that dividends are more sensitive to taxes than are wages. We first focus on owner wages. To test how taxes drive the magnitude of owner wages, we exploit the large kink in the marginal tax rate schedule around the first state tax threshold. Below this threshold, wages are taxed at 31.5%. Any marginal wage payment above this threshold is taxed at an additional 20% income tax. In theory, such a large kink in marginal tax rate affects the distribution of wages and leads to bunching of income at the kink point (Saez 2010).
The concept of bunching is simple. Let us consider two individuals in a tax system without a kink. Depending on individual preferences, both individuals set their labor supply in a labor/leisure decision. We assume that individual 1 provides more labor and, thus, earns a higher before-tax income y than individual 2, who earns less before-tax income (y L ). Under a proportional tax, the labor supply decision is unaffected by taxes and individual 1 provides more labor than individual 2. We now introduce a higher tax rate on before-tax income above y L . That is, we introduce a progressive tax similar to the U.S. tax code (with more kinks) or the Swedish tax code. The labor supply decision of individual 2 is unaffected, as this individual's marginal tax rate remains constant. However, the labor supply decision of individual 1 is potentially affected by the progressive tax rate. Since additional earnings ( = − ) are taxed at a higher tax rate, Saez (2010) shows that individuals with income above the kink reduce labor supply and locate around the kink since the (after-tax) utility of individual 1 is higher at the kink point than (slightly) above the kink point.
A large jump in marginal tax rate should lead to bunching at the kink point if shareholder wages respond to income taxes (e.g., Chetty et al. 2011 ). Since owner-managers can set their wages according to their individual tax status and preferences, we expect that wages are set around the first state tax threshold (see Table 1 ). 11 To test the tax sensitivity of owner wages 11 Empirical evidence on bunching at kink points suggests that, in particular, self-employed individuals bunch at kink points (e.g., Saez 2010, Bastani and Selin 2013). There is no or very little positive evidence on bunching at kink points for employed individuals in their samples.
empirically, we build on the methodology developed by Chetty et al. (2011) . We center labor income in year t (from closely held corporation(s) and other employers) around the first state tax threshold in year t (see Table 1 ). Then, we sort individuals into SEK 1,000 bins and count the number of owner-managers in each bin. Figure 6 shows a histogram of the actual distribution of labor income centered around the time-varying state tax threshold. We observe a sharp spike in the actual distribution at the kink and in the SEK 1,000 bin below the kink.
[Insert Figure 6 about here]
To quantify the effect of the kink on wages of owner-managers, we follow the Chetty et al.
(2011) approach and compare the actual distribution to a counterfactual distribution. The idea behind this approach is to fit a polynomial to the counts plotted in Figure 6 that excludes values around the kink. This produces a counterfactual distribution that is not affected by the kink in the tax rate schedule. We are interested in the difference between the empirical distribution and the counterfactual distribution around the kink. This area is denoted "excess mass." A positive and significant excess mass around the kink implies that owner-managers bunch wages around the kink point. That is, owner wages are tax sensitive. In our case, we use an SEK 10,000 range around the kink point and obtain an estimate of 3.173 and a t-statistic of 10.34. This result can be interpreted as follows: we observe 317% more owner-managers with wages around the kink point than we would observe in absence of the tax rate schedule kink.
To generate further evidence on bunching of labor income at the major kink point in the marginal income tax rate schedule, we repeat our main analysis from Figure 4 but present the histogram separately for each year (Figure 7 ). This addresses concerns that our effect may be driven by particular sample years. Further, this approach affords us the advantage of plotting the histogram on actual wages and not on centered wages around the state tax cutoff. In line with our previous results, we consistently find bunching of labor income in all years. Excess mass estimates are large and statistically significant for each year. This indicates that owner wages are indeed tax sensitive and that this effect is observable over a longer time-period.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
Figure 7 also shows several other interesting spikes in the distribution of labor income at SEK 240,000, SEK 300,000, SEK 360,000, and SEK 420,000. We denote these spikes as an even-number-effect. Owner-managers set their wages at even numbers (see, e.g., Kleven and Waseem 2013). In our case, these annual labor income figures correspond to monthly wages of exactly SEK 20,000, 25,000, 30,000, and 35,000, respectively. Bunching of labor income around these round numbers for several years is sign of smooth and sticky wages and corresponds to the lower SoA coefficient of wages in the Linter (1956) model.
We next test tax sensitivity to the two other kinks in the income tax rate schedule. First, we use the cutoff at which social security contributions become a pure tax. Around this kink, the marginal income tax rate increases by 11 percentage points. Second, we use the second level of state tax above which the marginal tax rate increases by 5 percentage points. Figure 8 presents the empirical distributions along with the counterfactual distributions and the excess mass estimates.
[Insert Figure 8 about here]
We find no significant estimates of excess massing around the other two kink points. That is, wages of owner-managers of closely held corporations are not sensitive to the 5% tax rate increase around the second state tax threshold. More importantly, it appears that ownermanagers do not respond to a change in social security benefits obtained from paying wages.
Therefore, the fact that wages create benefits from social security contributions cannot in itself explain the difference in the importance of wages vis-à-vis dividends. At first glance, this result appears surprising, since the marginal tax rate also increases substantially, by 11 percentage points. Two effects can explain this behavior and the lack of tax response. First, individuals are usually slow in their response to new circumstances and changing rules (Jones 2012). Second, individuals show greater response to taxes if such taxes are salient (Chetty et al. 2009 , Finkelstein 2009 ). The social security cutoff and the second state tax threshold used in Figure 8 are not very salient. In contrast, the first state tax cutoff (Figure 6 ), is very salient since the owner-manager is now subject to municipal and state tax.
Tax Sensitivity of Dividends
We next consider the tax effect on dividend payouts. Dividends from closely held corporations are taxed at a progressive tax rate. In contrast to wages, the threshold varies across owners, since the dividend allowance is calculated and accumulated by each shareholder on his own. 12 Therefore, each shareholder has an individual cutoff in the dividend tax rate schedule.
We follow the approach from above and repeat the analysis for dividends around the kink point created by the dividend allowance. From bunching theory, we expect that the distribution of dividend payouts around the dividend allowance is similar to the distribution of labor income around the state tax cutoff. We again sort dividend income (centered around the individual shareholder's accumulated dividend allowance) into SEK 1,000 and plot the histogram in Figure   9 . Instead of a smooth distribution with bunching around the kink point at 0, we observe a 12 Alstadsaeter and Jacob (2013b) find that some 5% of shareholders systematically overstate the dividend allowance. This has been overlooked by the tax authorities. Since these outrightly claimed dividend allowances are approved by the tax authority, we do not correct for overstated dividend allowances. Excluding these individuals does not alter our results. discontinuity in the distribution. This finding indicates that dividends are highly tax sensitive and that they are more sensitive to taxes than wage income. One explanation for this finding is that dividends are set at year-end when the tax situation of the fiscal year is very certain while monthly wages are set during the year or at the beginning of the fiscal year.
[Insert Figure 9 about here]
There are four potential explanations for this effect. First, individuals could confuse marginal tax rates and average tax rates (de Bartolome 1995). However, owner-managers show a notch-like reaction only in the case of dividends and not in the case of wages. Therefore, this argument alone is not a sufficient explanation. Second, the dividend allowance is very salient, even more salient than the first state tax cutoff (e.g., Chetty et al. 2009 , Finkelstein 2009 , on tax salience). Every year, owner-managers file a K10-form in which they state their current-year dividend allowance, the accumulated allowance, and the dividend payout on the very same page.
The salience of the dividend allowance and the resulting kink may explain why owner-managers locate right below or at the kink instead of paying excess dividends. Third, dividends are more flexible, as shown above. Owner-managers can retain earnings and shift dividend income over time to utilize future dividend allowances. Fourth, the tax rate increase around the kink can be large, and thus owner-managers are very responsive to the increase in the dividend tax rate.
We test the validity of this last explanation. We exploit cross-sectional and time series variation in dividend tax rates and test whether different groups respond differently. We split the data according to two variables. First, we use a pre-reform and post-reform sample. Second, we split the sample using the variable State Tax Level 1. That is, we divide the sample into ownermanagers who are subject to state and municipality tax and into owner-managers who pay municipality tax only. Using these four groups, we create substantial tax rate variation to test tax rate sensitivity. The increase in the dividend tax rate around the dividend allowance ranges from Tax, 2006 Tax, -2009 . Figure 10 repeats the analysis from Figure 9 for these four groups. We consistently find a similar pattern for dividend income in all four cases. That is, we rule out that dividend payouts are driven by the magnitude of the tax rate increase around the kink. Instead, our result suggests that dividend income is driven by the existence of the kink in the dividend tax rate schedule. The high salience of this kink, the opportunity to defer dividend payouts, and the potential confusion between average and marginal income tax rates may explain the tax sensitivity of dividend income of private firms.
[Insert Figure 10 about here]
Finally, we test whether our results are driven by agency costs. We repeat our main tests of tax sensitivity from Figure 6 and Figure 9 and restrict the sample to firms with no agency costs, that is, to firms with only one active owner. Owner-managers in firms without agency costs can set wages and dividends according to their own individual preferences. Hence dividends and wages should be more responsive to tax changes. Figure 11 shows that owner-managers of wholly integrated firms without agency costs also bunch labor income around the state tax threshold. The excess mass estimate is above the estimate for the whole population. If all agency costs are internalized, wages of owner-managers show greater tax sensitivity, since they can set payout policies according to their own preferences. For dividend income, we again find a similar pattern around the dividend allowance, but we find fewer individuals with dividend income above the kink. This result indicates that dividends and wage are more responsive to taxes when there are no agency costs. Yet, dividends are still more responsive to taxes than is labor income.
[Insert Figure 11 about here]
Dividend Taxes and Retention Policy
The strong reaction to the increase in the dividend tax rate around the dividend allowance has potential consequences on firm cash and investment policies. One implication of our findings in Section 4 is that dividends are used as a payout channel for excess cash holdings and retained earnings. If firms pay dividends only up to the owners' dividends allowances, firm retention and investment policies are affected. Firms are likely to retain their earnings to pay out dividends in later years. Firms can use this locked-in capital to invest in real and/or cash investments. To test whether firms retain earnings in response to shareholder taxes and whether retained earnings are used for cash or real investments, we follow the approach of Almeida et al. (2004) and run the following regression:
where we use three different dependent variables y , . First, we use the change in retained earnings (ΔRetained Earnings). We use two different investment variables, which capture different types of investment. We use the first difference in cash holdings as a proxy for cash investments (ΔCash Holding). We further use the change in fixed assets as a proxy for real investments (ΔReal Investment).
We are interested mainly in the profit sensitivity of retained earnings, cash holdings, and real investments and how dividend taxes affect this sensitivity. Therefore, we include a dummy variable, Ceiling, which takes the value 1 if at least one shareholder is dividend tax constrained, that is, any marginal dividend payout would be taxed as labor income. If capital is locked-in by the dividend allowance, we expect the profit sensitivity of retained earnings to be higher if additional dividend payouts are taxed at a higher rate ( 2 >0). We expect that the direct effect of Ceiling is negative. This is due to a mechanical effect, since Ceiling = 1 implies that dividends are distributed up to the dividend allowance, and this payout reduces retained earnings and cash holdings. As additional control variables, we include size (Ln(Total Assets)), a measure for growth opportunities (Sales Growth), change in working capital (ΔWorking Capital), and ΔShort-Term Debt as a measure of change in short-term liabilities (see Almeida et al. 2004 ). We estimate equation (3) at the firm level. We include firm-fixed effects as well as year-fixed effects. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Table 6 presents regression results for our three dependent variables. We find a positive effect from profits for each dependent variable. That is, higher profits are correlated with more retained earnings, cash holdings, and real investments. Our focus is on the interaction between Profit and Ceiling. The positive coefficient in Column 1 indicates that the profit sensitivity of retained earnings increases if shareholders face a higher tax rate on dividends. The coefficient estimates of 2 in Column 3 show that real investments are not correlated with the dividend ceiling. Real investments of privately held firms respond to changes in earnings, but the earnings-sensitivity of real investments is not affected by the dividend allowance. Rather, the dividend allowance has a substantial effect on cash holdings. The profit sensitivity of cash holdings increases by 0.0297 if the owner cannot receive more dividends at the preferential rate. This is equivalent to an increase in the profit sensitivity of cash holdings of 49%. Hence, the dividend ceiling effectively leads to higher cash holdings at the firm level at the cost of cash holdings at the shareholder level. However, these cash holdings can reduce insolvency risk or increase investment in the long run.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence on payout channels of privately held firms. Our results have three main implications. First, while listed corporations use dividends and share repurchases as alternative payout channels, privately held firms differ substantially in their preferred payout channels. Owner-managers of closely held corporations distribute the majority of funds in the form of owner wages. We find that wages are rather sticky and that dividends are used as a flexible payout channel. Share repurchases or capital decreases are empirically irrelevant. This finding explains the observation that privately held corporations distribute lower dividends than listed firms (Michaely and Roberts 2012).
Second, this paper adds to the literature on the flexibility of payout channels (e.g., Jagannathan et al. 2000, Grullon and Michaely 2002) . Our results imply that wages in private corporations assume the role of dividends in public corporations. Similar to the role of share repurchases in listed firms, dividends are the more flexible payout mechanism for privately held corporations. In private firms, dividends are paid out less frequently than owner wages.
Finally, this paper points toward the importance of shareholder taxes in firm payout choices. Table 2 for thresholds. Each point represents the number of observations in an SEK 1,000 bin around the respective threshold. The solid gray line is the counterfactual distribution based on the methodology of Chetty et al. (2011) . We use a 7 th -degree polynomial fitted to the empirical distribution excluding bins within the range of [-5,000;+5,000] around the respective threshold. This table presents regression results on cross-sectional differences in the flexibility of payout policies. We use the speed of adjustment coefficients on wages (SoAWage) and on dividends (SoADividends) as dependent variables. These coefficients are obtained from estimating equation (1) and are summarized in Table 3 . Independent variables are described in Table 2 . We use the mean over sample period for each owner as the independent variable. We use robust standard errors (s.e.). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 2 . We include owner-manager-fixed effects and year-fixed effects in all models. We report robust standard errors clustered at the CHC-owner level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Profit is the ratio of operating income to total assets. Ceiling is a variable equal to 1, if any marginal dividend payout is subject to labor income taxation at the shareholder level. In case of multiple owners, we use the average of this dummy across shareholders. As independent variables, we use growth in sales from t-2 to t (Sales Growth), size measured as the log of total assets (Ln(Total Assets)), change in noncash working capital to assets ratio (ΔWorking Capital), and change in short-term debt to assets (ΔShort-Term Debt). We include firm-fixed effects and year-fixed effects in all specifications. We report robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote a significant difference at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. We use data from Datastream. We restrict the sample to firms existing over 10 consecutive years. We present estimates for dividends (black line) and share repurchases (gray line).
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Figure A.2: Speed of Adjustment of Wages and Dividends-Restricting Sample to Fully Owned Firms of Shareholders with One Closely Held Corporation
This figure shows the density function for the distribution of speed of adjustment estimates from the Lintner (1956) model from equation (1) estimated separately for each sample firm. We restrict the sample to firms existing over 10 consecutive years. We present estimates for wages (black line) and dividends (gray line). We restrict the sample to firms with only one owner-manager who runs exactly one closely held corporation. Table 2 . We include owner-managerfixed effects and year-fixed effects in all models. We report robust standard errors clustered at the CHC-owner level in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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